Chamber and committees

Just let me develop this point.

We already have that in other areas of law. We say that people have to have certain beliefs or follow certain practices to take certain jobs. It is not a new concept, and it is important to note that we are not telling people that they must think in a certain way. All that we are saying is that particular homes, hospices, refuges or whatever will not carry out the procedure. That gives clarity to staff and to those who might want to use the service.

With regard to your first point, the overwhelming majority of people in Scotland now go to hospices at a very late stage. They do not go there for weeks or months; they go there for the very last few days of their lives. Very few people will go to a hospice for a long period of time. That is not how the hospice movement works in Scotland.

I would have more sympathy with that view if we were going down the road of Miles Briggs’s amendment 198. If there was a list that was available to somebody who wanted this, they could see who was and who was not willing to facilitate it. That would be very clear. I would be able to look on a website and see who was willing and who was not willing to do this and I could then go through that process. That is one of the issues.

I also think that the amendments do not deal with those at an administrative level who would be asked to do things that go against their views. I am worried that, again, we are going to exclude people from a workplace environment where they would be happy to do everything else that might be required, but not this particular thing. We may end up losing people from those workplaces.

I appreciate what Mr McArthur said. However, my amendment 190 is not about trying to obstruct patient choice, but about ensuring that individuals who are against assisted suicide are not drawn into it. To compel participation in assisted suicide, even as a referrer, is to turn conscience into mere compliance. My amendment, if it is accepted, would give protection in that regard.

My amendments 191 and 192 are follow-on amendments. Again, I accept what Mr McArthur says, but this area of law is new and depends on individual choices. That is why I think that the burden of proof should be reversed from what is in place for other areas of law.

Amendment 191 specifies that if

“a claim of conscientious objection”

is alleged to have

“been improperly or falsely made”,

the responsibility to prove or justify that claim

“lies with the person or institution”

making the allegation, rather than with the individual who is exercising the objection. The rationale is simple: it is to protect individuals and organisations that conscientiously refuse to participate, ensuring that they are not unfairly required to defend their ethical or moral stance.

Amendment 192—[Interruption.]. I am happy to take an intervention.

I am grateful. Thank you.

To some extent, amendment 143 is a probing amendment. Does the member recognise that, in the social security legislation that the Parliament passed in the previous session, six months was included in the definition of terminal illness to be used if someone wants to get benefits more quickly? Would you want to set any time limit, if an amendment were lodged at stage 3, or would you see there being no time limit at all?

Will the member reflect on the fact that, if the bill becomes an act, it will be there for generations to come? This kind of attitude can build up not necessarily in some direct way but through TV programmes, newspapers and social media. It might not be absolutely at the heart of what society thinks at the moment, but we could see, over a five or 10-year period, that sort of pressure building on vulnerable individuals, due to things that are reflected in society more widely.

Will the member take an intervention?

Good morning, convener, members of the committee and other members. Thank you for having us at the meeting to discuss some very important amendments. I will speak to amendments 143 and 144.

First, with regard to amendment 143, as the bill stands, the definition of “terminally ill” is extraordinarily broad. It would include individuals who could live not for weeks or months but for years. People who are managing long-term conditions, those who are receiving treatment that stabilises their illness, and people who still have meaningful time ahead of them would all fall within the scope of the bill as it is currently drafted. I do not think that that is what members of the Parliament or, indeed, more importantly, members of the public would imagine when they hear the phrase “assisted dying”. They would think of someone who is in the final stages of their life or who is perhaps days or weeks from death, not someone who still has years to live but is facing difficulty, fear or despair.

If the law is to mean anything, the definition must be clear as the bill proceeds and if it ultimately becomes an act; otherwise, future generations risk the reach of assisted suicide expanding far beyond what advocates publicly claim to intend, and what the member in charge has publicly stated.

This amendment seeks to restore that clarity. It would define “terminally ill” as a condition that,

“in the opinion of two independent registered medical practitioners ... can reasonably be expected to result in the person’s death within three months.”

That is not a technical tightening; it is a moral safeguard. It ensures that, if the Parliament chooses to go down this path, it does so honestly, with the legislation restricted to those who are truly at the end of life and not those who yet have years of life, love and care ahead of them. By supporting the amendment, members will protect the integrity of the bill’s purpose, and they will protect vulnerable people from a profound expansion of what assisted suicide could mean in Scotland. If we cannot agree on that limit—if we cannot even confine assisted suicide to those who are imminently dying—we must ask ourselves what kind of law we are truly making.

With regard to amendment 144, there is, as I said, an alarmingly broad definition in the bill. I have written to the Presiding Officer and to you, convener, about legal issues around that, and I await responses from both of you. However, as the bill is written at the moment, the door to assisted suicide is open for people who have many years—decades—of life ahead of them. As I said, that is not what people think of when they hear the phrase “assisted suicide”. They think of someone who is in the final stages of terminal illness, not someone who is living with mental illness, disability or poverty. Yet, as written, the bill risks crossing that line. It risks sending a message that assisted suicide could be open to someone like me, who is struggling with disability. It opens it to those who are struggling with disadvantage or despair. That is a profound moral error and a betrayal of the very people who need our care and solidarity.

My amendment seeks to put that right. It makes it clear that a person cannot be deemed eligible for assisted suicide if their primary reason for seeking it is a non-terminal condition, such as an eating disorder, an intellectual disability, a mood or anxiety disorder, receipt of disability benefits, loneliness, financial hardship or unsuitable housing. At the same time, the amendment recognises that people may live with those conditions alongside a genuine terminal illness. It therefore would not automatically exclude people with non-terminal conditions from being eligible; it would require only that the driving cause of a request is truly a terminal condition. We heard at stage 1 from members across the chamber that that is what they were seeking to do. The amendment is not about narrowing choice but about protecting meaning and, perhaps most importantly, protecting the most vulnerable in our society.

The amendment would ensure that assisted suicide is not even inadvertently offered as a substitute for care, community or hope. If the state begins to respond to suffering not with support but with death, we will cross the line of the compassionate society that we all want to be part of. I believe that we should not cross that line. This amendment asks us to hold that line with clarity, conscience and compassion.

I move amendment 143.

I am just looking for clarification. In principle, as the bill stands, if someone got a terminal diagnosis and had maybe 10 years to live, would you be content for that individual to go through the process—I appreciate that they would have to go through the safeguards—and then for the assisted suicide to take place?

Will the member give way?